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ABSTRACT
This thesis updates and expands upon the developmental theory of the gender gap in
party and ideological identification originally posited by Norris and Inglehart (2000) to explain
why women in advanced industrial nations are more likely to hold more leftist ideological
identification than men. A comparative cross-national analysis using data from the World Values
Survey (2004-2008) extends Norris and Inglehart’s study, with an examination of the gender gap
in advanced industrial, post-communist and developing nations. To further explore the nature of
the gender gap in the United States, data from the American National Election Study
(Cumulative File and 2012 cross-section) are used to explain the evolution of the ideological and
partisan gender gap over time. Moreover, such a focus can also help explain any subnational
difference in the gender gap in the two regions that have experienced a partisan realignment: the
South toward the Republican party and the Northeast toward the Democratic party.
Findings from the comparative analysis support the notion in advanced-industrial nations
the gender gap has persisted, and indeed grown, with women identifying more with the left than
men. This gender gap is robust as it remains significant even when utilizing a multivariate
analysis to control for variables that measure social structure and cultural attitudes. However, in
post-communist and developing nations a gender gap is less evident although some evidence
shows that women in post-communist societies are experiencing a secular realignment and are
slowly moving toward leftist ideological orientations. Findings from the analysis of the U.S.
demonstrate little regional differences, with women in the South being more liberal and
increasingly more Democratic, while women in the Northeast are also more liberal and
increasingly Democratic in their party identifications.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Much scholarly consensus exists to support the notion that since around the 1980s, postindustrial democracies such as those in Western Europe and the United States have been
experiencing an electoral realignment, with a new emerging gender based electoral cleavage
characterized by women identifying increasingly with political parties and ideologies of the Left
while men identify increasingly with Rightist ideology and parties (Box-Steffenmeier, DeBoef,
Lin, 2004; Christy, 1987; Dalton, 2008; Kauffman and Petrocik, 1999; Norris, 1988, 1999, 2002;
Norris and Evans, 1999; Norris and Inglehart, 2000, 2012). Relevant and salient cleavages, in
this case gender, which greatly impact the political attitudes of citizens are important to study
and analyze in order to better understand how and why voters make the decisions they do on
election day, as well as to have a greater understanding of the composition of political parties.
Also, if a gender based cleavage is found to be enduring and stable, there will be a substantial
impact on elections, voting behavior, and mass coalitional politics in general making this topic
particularly important to these areas of political research (Dalton, 2008; Norris and Evans, 1999).
An electoral realignment is essentially defined as the replacement of one societal
cleavage with another cleavage on the basis of interests or issues (Burnham 1970; Key 1955;
1959; Sundquist 1983). The focus here is on a gender based cleavage in ideology and
partisanship, and is tied to and works in close proximity with the “New Politics” cleavage, which
refers to an ideological division based on post-materialist issues like abortion, gay marriage,
gender equality, and environmental concerns which are relevant and prevalent to economically,
socially, and democratically developed societies (Dalton 2008). This “New Politics” cleavage,
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rather than the “Old Politics” cleavage characterized by issues like social welfare, class politics,
and economic policy, plays a role in producing and emphasizing this gender based partisan and
ideological realignment with women moving to the Left and men supporting the Right as many
new politics issues pertain specifically to women (Dalton 2008). This gender electoral
realignment resulting from “New Politics” issues is important to the literature on elections, as
electoral realignment is typically present in critical elections and shows a distinct change or
alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate (Key 1955; 1959; Mayhew 2002).
Furthermore, a greater understanding of this phenomenon is vital because the change in voting
patterns driving realignment determines the nature of politics and political action for many years
to follow. Typically, once a stable voting pattern is established, so too is the realignment,
altering voting behavior, institutional roles, and policy outputs (Burnham 1970).
Though gender based cleavages cut across the predominant and “traditional” social
group bases of party support, like socioeconomic status or income for example, and are often
considered to be secondary in relevance to such social welfare issues, Norris and Inglehart
(2000) have provided ample evidence to support the notion that not only are men and women
divided along partisan and ideological lines, but also that the level of economic and societal
development (modernization) specific to a region plays a large role in this division. Essentially,
the developmental theory of the gender gap posits that more industrialized and democratically
and socially developed nations like that of Western Europe and the United States are influenced
by new and post-materialistic cleavages (New Politics), while developing and post-communist
societies like Mexico and Russia are found to adopt more traditional, materialistic cleavages (Old
Politics) with women adhering mostly to Rightist parties and ideologies. The disparity in issue
2

saliency and relevance between developed societies and their less developed counter parts
produce two different types of gender gaps: a modern one for the developed societies and a more
traditional one for the developing and post-communist ones.
This study seeks to support the idea that the level of societal modernization in a nation is
linked to cultural and structural trends in that country that influence partisanship and ideology,
also known as the developmental theory of the gender gap. Higher levels of modernization and
democratic development are associated with the rise of post-materialist values and lower levels
of modernization and democratic development in a country are associated with materialist, more
traditional values (Dalton 2008; Norris and Inglehart 2000). Because value systems influence
the decision making process in regard to issue opinions, voting, and ideology, the differing value
systems based on societal development produce predictable voting patterns based on society
type. Therefore, based on the developmental theory of the gender gap as proposed by Norris and
Inglehart (2000), a cross-national analysis and comparison will be employed based on societal
development and modernization as well as a U.S. specific analysis. This study seeks to update
and extend Norris and Inglehart’s 1980-2000 study to 2008 in order to better understand the
nature of the gender gap and electoral realignment.
The Cross-National Study
Because Norris and Inglehart find evidence of discernible voting patterns on the basis of
gender and democratic society type, the main hypotheses in this study are: (1) women in
advanced industrial societies are more likely to identify with Leftist ideology than their male
counterparts, (2) women in post-communist societies are more likely to have “traditional”
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ideologies and will identify more with the Right ideologically than their male counterparts, and
(3) women in developing societies are more likely to identify with ideologies of the Right than
their male counterparts. For continuity and comparability to the study by Norris and Inglehart,
the World Values Survey (2004-2008) will be used in this portion of the analysis and
multivariate regressions will be run to test the hypotheses.
The U.S. Specific Study
Additionally, due to a vast amount of literature focusing on the gender gap in the U.S.
exclusively, with some authors even arguing that such a gap is most prominent or only exists in
the U.S, I apply the developmental theory to the U.S. and hypothesize that (4) women in the U.S.
are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male
counterparts, (5) women in the south are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and
liberal ideology than their male counterparts, and (6) women in the northeast are more likely to
identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts.
Although the United States is an advanced industrialized nation showing signs of
experiencing a modern gender gap, the unique partisan and ideological polarization that is
present within the U.S., specifically between the northeast and the southern regions, may affect
the strength or the presence of the gap. Perhaps the developmental theory could be applied to
these two regions, showing a connection between the level of economic development in either
the northeast or south to the political parties that maintain a stronghold in those states. For
example, many southern states which lag in post-industrial development like South Carolina,
Kentucky, and Mississippi are considered to be some of the strongest Republican states.
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Conversely, states with a strong Democratic presence like those in the northwest and northeast
for instance are very post-industrial in nature, with the spread of ideas and various service
industries replacing traditional manufacturing companies and industries (Black and Black 1987;
2008; Judis and Texeira 2002).
Furthermore, college educated women are increasingly characterized as a “democratic
group” while college educated men are increasingly identifying with the Republican Party.
Analyzing this concept given that the northeast is experiencing an emerging democratic majority
while the south remains predominantly Republican should provide some insight on the nature of
the gender gap in the United States (Judis and Texeira 2002; Schaller 2006). The differences in
partisanship and ideology in these regions based on gender will make for an interesting find and
will certainly add to the literature on voting behavior and ideological orientation in the United
States.
Multivariate regressions will be run by decade from the 1970s to 2008 using pooled
American National Election Study (ANES) data in order to compare partisanship and ideology of
the less economically developed south to that of the industrially thriving northern states. Also,
regressions will be run using the 2012 Cross Section Data from the ANES to include the most
recent and current ideological and partisanship information. Because the United States is often
over-studied in the realm of political science, a number of theorists and authors have covered the
presence of the gender gap in the region but with mixed, contrary results and outcomes.
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Figure 1 (below) provides some clarity to this issue by showing the gender gap in voting in
presidential elections in the U.S. from 1952 to 2012 and illustrates the emerging gender based
cleavage.
Year

Men

Women

Gap (difference)

2012
2008
2004
2000
1996
1992
1988
1984
1980
1976
1972
1968
1964
1960
1956
1952

-8
0
-12
-7
+1
+4
-12
-28
-15
+8
-26
-2
+20
+4
-10
-6

+12
+14
+4
+8
+15
+8
-4
-10
-5
-3
-24
+2
+24
-2
-22
-16

20 pts.
14 pts.
16 pts.
15 pts.
14 pts.
4 pts.
8 pts.
18 pts.
10 pts.
11 pts.
2 pts.
4 pts.
4 pts.
6 pts.
12 pts.
10 pts.

Figure 1 Gender Gap in Voting for President (Final Pre-Election Polls)
Source: 2012 Gallup Poll
The figure shows the lead-deficit for the Democratic candidate among men and women in these elections, in
percentage points. The values represent the pre-election estimate of the majority candidate vote for each election
weighted based on the actual election results.

According to the 2012 Gallup poll results in figure 1, a positive lead is shown for the
Democratic candidate by both men and women in 1992, but the lead becomes overwhelming
amongst women in 1996 with a 14 point lead in democratic candidate support. 2012 shows the
largest voting gap at 20 points, with a 12 percentage point lead among women and 8 percentage
point deficit among men which. Ultimately, the Gallup poll shows that women have overall
supported the Democratic candidate in each election since 1992, that the gender gap is growing
6

in regard to partisanship, and provides evidence that the gender gap is an important factor in U.S.
presidential elections and is in need of further study.
By extending Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) study on men and women’s party and
ideological preferences in advanced industrial societies we can assess whether a modern gender
gap with more Leftist leaning women and more Rightist leaning men is persisting or growing
more pronounced, and by examining these preferences in developing and post-communist
societies it can be determined if continuing development, modernization and establishment as a
democracy is resulting in a similar pattern. This research seeks to update and add to the existing
study by extending the time period to 2008 cross-nationally and to 2012 in the analysis of the
United States. Most importantly, this research seeks to show that not only does societal
development or modernization influence partisanship and ideology, but also that the resulting
gender gap in partisanship and ideology is a relevant and salient cleavage.
Strong relationships are expected between gender and ideology and gender and
partisanship. The multivariate regression analysis may show that women in advanced industrial
societies tend to be more Left leaning ideologically and in regard to partisanship than men, and
that women in developing and post-communist societies are more Right leaning ideologically
and in regard to partisanship than their advanced industrial counter parts. These findings would
support the hypotheses and lend additional support and validity to Norris and Inglehart’s theory.
However, women in post-communist and developing democracies may be slightly more Leftist
than they used to be, which only further shows that as modernization and democratic
establishment increases, so too does the prominence of liberal ideology and Leftist partisanship
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for women. Another possible outcome of the study is that the relationship between gender and
partisanship and gender and ideology may turn out to be weaker than previously thought, and
perhaps more region specific factors need to be taken into consideration. In this case, the theory
would not be generalizable across countries or society types and other avenues would need to be
explored.
The organization of the study will be as follows: chapter two will cover the relevant
literature pertaining to the gender gap in partisanship and ideology, starting with the traditional
gender gap, theories of gender dealignment, theories of gender realignment, and an extended
explanation of the developmental theory of the gender gap. Chapter three covers the data and
methodology used for the cross-national analysis and the U.S. specific analysis. Chapter four
discusses the findings and highlights of the cross-national analysis. Chapter five shows the
findings and highlights of the U.S. specific analysis. Chapter six then summarizes the findings,
draws conclusions, and explores ideas for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
The Traditional Gender Gap
Historically, women favored and identified with Right wing parties more so than males in
Western Democracies, specifically in the U.S. and Western Europe (Durverger 1955; Lipset
1960; Butler and Stokes 1974; Inglehart 1977; Norris and Inglehart 2000; Norris and Inglehart
2012; Dalton 2008). Similarly, Verba, Nie, and Kim (1978) found that men were more
politically active than women in the pre-1970s and that these gender differences persisted even
after controlling for education, institutional affiliations, and psychological involvement in
politics.
Previous explanations and analyses for the phenomenon of the traditional gender gap
focused on structural sex differences, like religiosity and labor force participation for example
(Norris and Inglehart 2000). Lipset (1960) found that attending churches was highly associated
with party preference. Church attendance in general, but specifically among Catholics, was a
significant indicator of identification and support for conservative or Christian Democratic
parties among women during the 1950s (Norris and Inglehart 2000).
The traditional gender gap, however, began to lose salience and relevance around the
1980s as gender differences in party choice began to change or “dealign”, whereby gender no
longer directly indicated partisan or ideological affiliation (Dalton 2008; Norris and Inglehart
2000).

By the mid 1990s, the traditional gender gap in electoral turn-out had become

insignificant in most advanced industrial societies, however the gap continued to persist in both
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post communist and developing societies with Norris and Inglehart (2000) obtaining similar
results in regard to partisanship and ideology (Norris 2002; Norris and Evans 1999).
Theories of Gender Dealignment
Gender dealignment, which began in the early 1980s throughout many Western
Democracies, can be defined as the point at which sex differences between men and women in
regard to party choice and ideology became minimal to non-existent (Norris and Inglehart 2000).
The tendency of women to lean Right in regard to partisanship began to waver at this time in
Great Britain (Hayes and McAllister, 1997), the Netherlands (Mayer and Smith, 1995), and New
Zealand (Vowles, 1993), disrupting the traditional social-party linkages in these post-industrial
democracies. The rise of feminism and feminist issues changed the political orientation of some
younger women, as parties of the Left developed a compassionate stance on “women’s issues”
(Conover 1988). Shortly thereafter voting differences between males and females narrowed, and
then reversed with women increasingly supporting parties of the Left (Dalton 2008). The United
States however experienced only a brief period of dealignment and quickly shifted to
realignment or a change in the bases of party support due to new cultural issues defining
ideology in the 1980s (Norris and Inglehart, 2000; Schaffer and Clagget, 1995).
The existing literature is somewhat divided on the presence of dealignment, attributing
the change in ideological stances of women to government performance, party policy, or
leadership images rather than changes in cultural and structural changes around the 1980s in
advanced industrial democracies (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Some scholars found that during
the time of alleged “dealignment” that the majority of women in established democracies leaned
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Left (Norris 1988), Right (Jelen, Thomas, Wilcox 1994), or were actually no different than their
male counterparts (Mayer and Smith 1995). Though the presence of dealignment is often
debated, there is much scholarly consensus that a gender realignment did occur throughout the
advanced industrial democracies or societies, with its origin as the source of inquiry and debate.
Theories of Gender Realignment
The study performed by Norris and Inglehart (2000) provided the first concrete evidence
to support a realignment toward the Left for women throughout advanced industrial societies.
Realignment here is defined similarly to how these authors and others describe “partisan
realignment”, which is “enduring and stable changes in the mass coalitional basis of party
politics” (Norris and Evans, 1999). One example of such an electoral change is that of the
African American realignment to the Democratic Party during and after the civil rights era
(Black and Black, 1987). The realignment or the resulting gender gap is stable, consistent, and
politically significant according to Gallup Poll data on “The Gender Gap in Voting” (Norris and
Inglehart 2000; pp 445). This study seeks to provide updated evidence and additional support to
the idea of ideological realignment on the basis of gender.
Unfortunately, some available empirical evidence suggests that gender does not
sufficiently explain voting patterns. From their study on the “frozen cleavages”, Lipset and
Rokkan (1967) assert that gender is secondary in importance and impact when compared to
cleavages like social class, religion, and region, but then later decide that sex differences stand
out as an influential factor in party politics. In 2008, the difference between men and women in
regard to party voting averages less than 10%, which leads skeptics to deny a gap altogether.
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Also, in the U.S. presidential elections in 2004, the gender gap was perceived to be modest in
comparison to other influences on voter choice (Dalton 2008). However, Norris (1999) points
out that significant voting differences do begin to emerge on the bases of gender when combined
with life status measures like employment status and occupation type.
Norris and Inglehart (2000) identify two major schools of thought on the potential
mechanism causing realignment or the modern gender gap with females supporting parties of the
Left more than men. The first is the one adopted by Norris and Inglehart, which claims that
structural and cultural trends in advanced industrial and modernized societies, like secularization
and the transformation of sex roles, affect the political identity of the electorate and therefore
causes female Leftist realignment. The second rejects the notion that all modern societies are
facing realignment, but that factors specific to the U.S. like the lack of strong class cleavages,
prevalence of two-party competition, and the salience of “women’s issues” like abortion are
causing the realignment in the region solely. This study seeks to show evidence of the modern
gender gap in both the United States and in other advanced industrial nations, thus supporting the
developmental theory of the gender gap.
Box-Steffenmeier, De Boef, Lin (2004) in their study focused on the U.S. have a similar
theory to that of Norris and Inglehart (2000), including both societal conditions and politics as
driving gender differences in voting, party choice, and ideology. The authors find that from
1980-2000, the gender gap emerged when the political climate became more “conservative”, the
economy deteriorated, and when women were the most disadvantaged as the percent of
economically vulnerable women increased. However, this theory relies heavily on economic
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conditions and uses survey data from CBS News and NY Times, which doesn’t explain
partisanship and ideological change in other advanced industrial societies.
Another theory of gender realignment focuses on the change in the likelihood of political
or voting participation between the sexes rather than partisanship or ideology. Traditional
gender differences in voting participation faded during the 1980’s and in some cases reversed in
many advanced industrial countries (Christy 1987; Norris 2002). In U.S. presidential elections
since 1980, the proportion of eligible female adults who voted exceeded the proportion of
eligible males who voted, and the same phenomenon is noted in non presidential midterm
elections since 1986 (Norris 2002). Norrander (2003) in supporting the U.S. centric view uses
CBS and NY Times exit poll data and finds that women are slightly more partisan and identify
with the Democratic Party than men. Since women are participating politically more often than
males and are identifying increasingly with the Left ideologically and in regard to party
preference, a mass realignment could be changing the behavior in the electorate on a large scale
across nations.
Next, a cutting edge, but controversial argument about the origin of the gender gap is
based on biology and genetics rather than social constructs. Gilligan (1982) supported the
psychological perspective that women and men approach this differently, with women’s
psychology focused on an ethic of care and with men’s psychology focused on an ethic of
justice. Hatemi, Medland, and Eaves (2009) built upon this idea and studied twins to examine the
political preferences between men and women based on biological conditions and genetic
influence. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) who performed a similar study on twins to
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understand political preferences provided “strong” evidence for this argument as did Hatemi,
Medland, and Eaves. However, the authors ultimately outlined the inability of separating genetic
influences from the environment as a pitfall of the study, which shows that methods need to be
perfected in order to further examine such a theory.
Also, race and gender are often studied together to understand the gender gap in the U.S.
Kaufmann (2002, 2006) shows that race can often be a more relevant cleavage than gender, with
white men and women in the South voting Republican and with African Americans of both sexes
voting Democratic. The author actually argues that the gender gap is shrinking and that men are
driving the gap by consistently identifying more with the Republican Party while women have
more variance in their party preferences. The gender gap actually appears to be a white gender
gap, whereby white women are more likely to support the Democratic Party while white men
appear to be increasingly supporting the Republican Party. Kaufmann (2002) also includes
female specific issues as influencing party identification and finds significant results for both
female issues and race.
Another argument about the source of the gender gap examines the importance of the
women’s movement and feminism in affecting the vote choice of men and women. In both the
U.S. and Western Europe, the women’s movement occurred in the latter half of the 20 th Century
and made a substantial impact on the political participation levels of women (Dalton 2008).
Conover (1988), takes a U.S. centric viewpoint, and also identifies the gap as a result of “the
growth of feminist identity” and driven by the women’s movement of gender equality, not postmaterialist values of self-expression and freedom as asserted by Norris and Inglehart (2000,
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2012). Similarly, Carroll (1987, 1988) provides evidence for mobilization and autonomy
theories which shows that women want and seek economic independence and tend to support
“female” policy issues (Huddy and Carey, 2009).
Some scholars recognize the modern gender gap and attribute women’s Left leanings to
the resource disparities between men and women, specifically in education and income (Burns,
2007). On the contrary, Howell and Day (2000) assert that education has a liberalizing effect on
women, with more highly educated women identifying more with parties of the Left. In the U.S.,
some scholars believe that the gap is due to greater support among women for a wide variety of
Leftist issues, not just those that at gender specific ones. The “vulnerability hypothesis”
illustrates this and explains that women, being disadvantaged in patriarchal society, will advocate
and support social programs that assist all others that are disadvantaged (Schlesinger and
Heldman 2001). Also, prior research has focused on sex differences in public opinion in the U.S.
on issues like welfare expenditures, pro-environmental protection, and actions of the military in
which women have taken more liberal opinions and stances (Erie and Rein, 1988; Page and
Shapiro, 1993; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton, 1997).
Critics of gender gap theories in vote choice and ideology often focus on the idea that
gender related issues do cut across party lines. According to Dalton (2008), in the U.S. political
party positions are clearly stated on most issues, but parties are internally divided on gendered
issues like the role of women in the family and in the work place. Similarly, Huddy and Carey
(2009) look at the effect of group attachments like gender on vote choice and party identification
and find that women have “fragmented” political loyalties and that the gender gap is most
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pronounced in elections in which “female” issues are salient. However, in Germany and France,
the impact of gender is stronger as Catholic voter blocs and/or Christian parties polarize opinions
on such issues. Also, many democracies still do not have any popular women’s parties that
appeal exclusively to “women’s issues” like reproduction for example (Howell and Day, 2000).
Given the lack of a popular party for females, a gender based cleavage is definitely worthy of
analysis in order to better understand vote choice and ideological differences in the electorate.
The Developmental Theory of Gender Realignment
In the U.S., the gender realignment meant that the traditional gap persisted in the 1950s
and 1960s, faded in the 1970s, and around the 1980s a new ”modern” gender gap emerged which
is reflected by women’s Democratic party identification and support in presidential,
gubernatorial, and state elections. Norris and Inglehart (2000) also provide evidence in their
piece that similar patterns are found in other Western Democracies with women identifying
increasingly with parties of the Left. The alignment between the growing support for parties of
the Left by females, the modern gender gap, in advanced industrial societies and evidence of the
traditional gender gap persisting in post-communist and developing societies provided
overwhelming support for the “developmental theory of gender realignment” that Norris and
Inglehart (2000) crafted. This study aims to update and extend their findings.
The Developmental Theory essentially states that structural and cultural trends common
to advanced industrial societies have realigned women to parties of the Left (Norris and Inglehart
2000). This theory ties in closely with post-modernization theory, which posits that “In
advanced industrial societies, the increase of post materialist values in the younger generations
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has led to a gradual but steady decline in the class politics of economic and physical security
(materialism), opening the way for prioritizing values of freedom, self-expression and gender
equality (Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997). So, the developmental theory shows that transformation
of sex roles in post-industrial societies has influenced the process of value change (Norris and
Inglehart 2000).

Put another way, structural factors (secularization and modernization) cause

and interact with cultural attitudes and values thereby influencing ideology and political party
preference.
Examples of this value change in post-industrial or advanced industrial societies can be
seen as both men and women are in the workforce, education is readily available for females and
more modern or alternative family lifestyles are accepted (Manza and Brooks 1998). In fact,
most Americans now support equal opportunities for both men and women, with more traditional
sex roles being rejected. This example is illustrated through the point that in 1936 only 22% of
Americans approved of married women working compared to an approval rating of over 80% in
the 1990’s (Dalton 2008).
Traditional or pre-industrial societies on the other hand typically have gender roles that
discourage women in the workforce outside of the home and support child bearing and rearing as
the female’s central goal (Norris and Inglehart 2000). The structural and cultural norms in these
regions are reinforced by the present lag in economic and democratic development, which calls
for men to stay working and women to maintain a full-time position in the household. For these
reasons, it is expected that women in post industrial societies will support parties of the Left and
adopt Left ideological stances that reinforce their particular, society specific values while women
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in developing, post-communist, and pre industrial societies will continue to support Rightist
ideological orientations and traditional parties of the Right.
Additionally, although egalitarian values present in most advanced industrial societies are
pushing women to the Left ideologically, the lack of complete equality women face in such
societies may be pushing them even further in that direction. For example, currently women
make approximately 77 cents to the male $1 and are more likely to live in poverty than males
according to the UN (1995). Also, women are over-represented in low paying jobs of the public
sector, like education and health care, which are well known to be treated with compassion by
parties of the Left (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Clearly egalitarian values are more prominent in
advanced industrial societies, but some of the lingering institutionalized inequality outlined
above may contribute to Left orientation of women. So, if modernization does indeed influence
the gender gap, then we, like Norris and Inglehart, expect that support for post materialist values
is associated with women’s support of Leftist parties.
Some scholars recognize the modern gender gap and attribute women’s Left leanings to
the resource disparities between men and women, specifically in education and income (Burns
2007). For example, Howell and Day (2000) assert that education has a liberalizing effect on
women, with more highly educated women identifying more with parties of the Left. In the U.S.,
some scholars believe that the gap is due to greater support among women for a wide variety of
Leftist issues, not just those that at gender specific ones. The “vulnerability hypothesis”
illustrates this and explains that women, being disadvantaged in patriarchal society, will advocate
and support social programs that assist all others that are disadvantaged (Schlesinger and
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Heldman 2001). Also, prior research has focused on sex differences in public opinion in the U.S.
on issues like welfare expenditures, pro-environmental protection, and actions of the military in
which women have taken more liberal opinions and stances (Erie and Rein 1988; Page and
Shapiro 1993; Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997).
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODS
Cross-National Analysis Variables
In order to re-create the analysis by Norris and Inglehart (2000), multivariate regressions
are run to test the hypotheses. For the cross-national analysis in chapter four, the data is obtained
from the World Values Survey and includes information from 2004 to 2008. The countries are
coded by society type, 1 for advanced industrial societies, 2 for post-communist societies, and 3
for developing societies which follows Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) classifications and serve as
the control variables. While post-communist and developing societies are now more commonly
known as less developed countries (LDCs) or newly industrialized countries (NICs) in
contemporary comparative and cross-national literature, Norris and Inglehart’s classifications are
used here for continuity and comparability. The countries included in this study are based on
availability in the World Values Survey and inclusion in Norris and Inglehart’s study and are the
U.S., Great Britain, France, Germany, Australia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Canada, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland for the “advanced industrial societies”; Poland,
Romania, and the Ukraine for the “post-communist societies”; and India, South Africa,
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, and Turkey for the “developing societies”.
The first nine regression models in chapter four are given in the context of society type so
the effect of all of the independent variables on ideology can be clearly seen within each society.
Then, table 4 chapter 4 shows the gender gap in ideology in every individual country, showing
which nations are most affected by this phenomenon.
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Dependent Variable
The main dependent variable is ideology, which is a 10-point scale ranging from 1 “most
left” to 10 “most right”. In order to gauge ideological preference, respondents were told “In
political matters, people talk of the “left” and the “right”. How would you place your views on
this scale, generally speaking?” While a left-right voting scale is also used as a main dependent
variable in Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) study, one is not included as a variable in the crossnational portion of this thesis due to coding issues. While this is a slight downfall in regard to
comparing the results of the two studies, ideology is a relevant dependent variable, sometimes
used as a proxy for party identification, and will likely provide insight on the gender gap in this
regard. In fact, some studies have shown that in the context of cross-national research, the leftright ideological scale is a more valid measurement than the left-right component applied in
many multi-party identification scales (Norris and Inglehart 2000).
Independent Variables
The main independent variable is gender, which is a dummy variable coded 0 for males
and 1 for females. The other independent variables are “social structure” operationalized as
religiosity, socioeconomic status/ occupational status, employment status, age, and education and
“cultural attitudes” operationalized by support for the women’s movement and post-materialism.
The coding for the “social structure” variables are as follows: religiosity is a 7- point scale coded
1 for frequently attending religious services to 7 never attending religious services. Respondents
were asked “Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend
religious services?” Socioeconomic or occupational status is a 9-point scale coded 1 for unskilled
workers to 9 professional workers. Respondents were asked “In which profession/occupation do
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you work?” Employment status is a dummy variable coded 1 for full-time, part-time, or self
employed and 0 as all others. Age is operationalized as continuous years. Education is a 9-point
scale coded 1 for no formal education to 9 university level with degree. Respondents were asked
“What is the highest educational level that you have attained?”
The cultural attitudes operationalizations are as follows: the support for the women’s
movement measure is a 4-point scale with 1 as no confidence at all in the women’s movement to
4 quite a lot of confidence in the movement. Respondents were told, “I am going to name a
number of organizations and for each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in
them?” The post-materialism measure is a 4-point index coded 1 as identifying with no
identification, 2 as materialist, 3 as mixed, and 4 as post-materialist. Again, the coding is based
on Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) study for comparability purposes. These variables represent the
structural and cultural factors that influence ideology based on the findings of Norris and
Inglehart (2000) and are therefore appropriate for this analysis.
The first three tables in chapter 4 or the cross-national chapter display the 9 regression
models that test hypotheses 1 through 3. Table 1 includes models 1-3, displaying the regressions
for the advanced industrial societies, Table 2 includes models 4-6 and displays the regressions
for the post-communist societies, and Table 3 includes models 7-9 and shows the regressions for
the developing societies. Models 1, 4, and 7 test the effect of gender alone on ideology, models
2, 5, and 8 test the effect of gender and the social structure variables on ideology, and models 3,
6, and 9 test the effect of gender, social structure, and cultural attitudes on ideology while
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controlling for region. Table 4 shows regressions testing the effect of gender, social structure,
and cultural attitudes on ideology across all nations, further testing hypotheses 1 through 3.
U.S. Specific Analysis Variables
In chapter 5, multivariate regressions will again be employed for an in depth analysis of
the relationship between gender and partisanship and gender and ideology in the United States.
The regression models including decades from the 1970s to the 2000s utilize variables from the
American National Election Studies (ANES) cumulative file, while models from year 2012 use
data from the ANES 2012 Cross Section Study. The 2012 Cross Section includes both face to
face and web based respondents. Also, in the 2000’s decade, only years 2000, 2004, and 2008
are included in the regressions as there was no ANES in 2006 or 2010 and the 2002 ANES has
an exceptionally small N.
First, table 5 shows the effects of gender on party identification in the U.S. by decade,
from the 1970s until 2012 and table 6 shows the effects of gender on ideology in the U.S. by
decade from the 1970s until 2012. The purpose of these models is to test hypothesis 4 which
asserts that women in the U.S. are more likely to identify with liberal ideology and the
Democratic Party than men. The regression models in tables 5 and 6 control for social structure
and cultural attitudes although the findings for those variables are not reported in the tables. This
portion of the analysis, unlike the previous cross-national models in this study, will include party
identification as a dependent variable. Analyzing partisanship and ideological patterns over a
span of decades, starting in the 1970s, should paint a portrait of how the gender gap has changed
over time and help guide theorists in predicting how it will look in the future.
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Dependent Variables
The two main dependent variables in this analysis are party identification and ideology
and they are coded similarly in the cumulative file and the time series study. Party identification
is operationalized as a self-placement 7-point scale ranging from 1 “Strong Democrat”, 2 “Weak
Democrat”, 3 “Independent-Democrat”, 4 “Independent”, 5 “Independent-Republican”, 6 ”Weak
Republican”, to 7 ”Strong Republican”. Ideology is operationalized as a self-placement 7-point
scale ranging from 1 “Extremely Liberal”, 2 “Liberal”, 3 “Slightly Liberal”, 4 “Moderate”, 5
“Slightly Conservative”, 6 “Conservative”, to 7 “Extremely Conservative”. Because these
dependent variables were employed in Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) analysis, comparing these
findings to theirs as well as to those in chapter 4 of this piece will be more parsimonious and
logical.
Independent Variables
The main independent variable in these models is gender, coded 1 for females and 0 for
males for both the cumulative file and time series data sets. Again, social structure and cultural
attitude measures are utilized in conjecture with Norris and Inglehart’s study. The “social
structure” variables are operationalized as race, age, religiosity, employment, education, marital
status, and the “cultural attitude” variable is abortion.
The coding for the “social structure” variables is as follows: race is coded 1 for whites
and 0 for all other races, as the gender gap is often considered to be a “white gender gap”, with
other races, specifically African Americans, voting in solidarity regardless of sex (Kauffman
2002, 2006). Additionally, Judis and Texeira (2002) explain that the most democratic groups are
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college educated females and minorities, further showing that the gender gap appears to apply
specifically the whites and justifying the exclusion of other races in this study. Because African
Americans, both male and female, in the U.S. tend to identify with the Democratic Party and
with liberal ideology, the gap would be diminished by including this group in the analyses.
Age is operationalized through continuous years in the cumulative file dataset but is used
a twelve point scale of age groups in the 2012 times series data. The age groups are coded 1 for
age 17-20, 2 for 21-24, 3 for 25-29, 4 for 30-34, 5 for 35-39, 6 for 40-44, 7 for 45-49, 8 for 5054, 9 for 55-59, 10 for 60-64, 11 for 65-69, and 12 for 70+.
Religiosity is operationalized similarly in both ANES data sets and is church or religious
attendance which is a 5-point scale ranging from 1 never attending religious services to 5
attending every week.
Employment is operationalized as 1 being employed currently and 0 currently not
employed, as comparing just the employed to the not employed will provide more clear and
definitive results than including each categorical group. The not employed category includes
those that are disabled, retired, students, homemakers, and those that are temporarily laid off.
Education in the ANES cumulative file is coded 1 for grade school or less, 2 for highschool (non-college), 3 for some college (no degree), and 4 for college degree or higher, while
education in the 2012 time series is coded 1 for less than high-school credential, 2 for highschool
credential, 3 for some post high-school (no bachelor’s degree), and 4 bachelor’s degree and
higher.
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The marital status measure is coded 1 for those who are married and 0 for the unmarried.
The unmarried category includes those who are divorced, widowed, separated, and never
married. Putting all unmarried respondents in one category rather than distinguishing between
them makes for a more clear comparison and is appropriate for this particular analysis.
The “cultural attitude” variable used in the analysis of the United States is abortion
attitudes. Unfortunately the ANES data sets do not have workable women’s movement or
materialism/post-materialism measures so abortion attitudes will have to be used as a proxy.
From the 1950s through the 1970s respondents were asked, “When should abortion be allowed?”
and from the 1980s into 2012 respondents were asked “By law, when should abortion be
allowed?” This change was implemented after the decision in Roe v. Wade (1973) legalizing
abortion in the U.S. citing the right to privacy in the due process clause of the 14 th amendment.
The changing of the question wording to include “by law” can potentially influence the way
respondents answer and think about questions, therefore the distinction between the abortion
variables must be taken into consideration. Abortion attitudes is operationalized as a four point
scale ranging from 1 “a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion”, 2 “abortions should
be permitted for other or personal reasons such as health related reasons”, 3 “abortions should
only be permitted in the case of rape”, 4 “abortion should never be permitted”.
There are also two contextual variables; the Northeast and the South. The Northeast is
coded 1 for the northeastern states and 0 for all other states. The northeastern states are
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. The South is coded 1 for the South and 0 for all others. The
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southern states included in the South variable are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Washington
D.C., Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina and South
Carolina. Other regions excluded and coded as 0 are the western and the north central states.
Finally, Table 7 shows the effects of gender on party identification in the Northeast and
table 8 shows the effects of gender on ideology in the Northeast. These tables test hypothesis 6
which asserts that women in the northeast are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party
and liberal ideology than their male counterparts. Table 9 shows the effect of gender on party
identification in the south and table 10 shows the effect of gender on ideology in the south.
These tables test hypothesis 5 which asserts that women in the south are more likely to identify
with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts. The regressions in
tables 7-10 control for social structure and cultural attitudes, though the findings for all of those
independent variables are not reported in the tables.
Recent studies have found that Democratic gains in the Northeast have been offset by and
occur in conjecture with increasing Republican Party identification in the South (Black and
Black 2008). Judis and Texiera (2002) and Schaller (2006) claim that the Democratic stronghold
in the Northeast and Western regions lay the geographic foundation of an emerging Democratic
majority. Given that the northeast and south have distinct and prominent partisan majorities, it
will be interesting to see if the modern gender gap persists in these regions, particularly in the
Republican south. Therefore, an analysis of the gender gap in regard to ideology and
partisanship by region will add to the literature on partisanship and ideology in the United States.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS
Table 1: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Advanced Industrial Societies,
2004-2008
Model 1
Gender Only

Gender
Social Structure
Religiosity
Socioeconomic Status
Age
Education
Employment Status
(Employed)

Model 2
Gender + social
Structure

-.17**

-.22**
-.13**
.00**
.05**
.00
.00

Attitudes
Post Materialism
Support for women’s
Movement
Adj. R Squared
N
Standard Error

Model 3
Gender + social
Structure + cultural
Attitudes
-.14**
-.12**
.00**
.05**
.04**
.01

-.37**
.28**

.00
15,348
.03

.03
14,985

.09
13,310

.03

.03

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the ideological scale; 1=most left, 10=most right. Constant
not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05
Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008

Table 1 displays the results of the multivariate regressions testing hypothesis 1, that a
modern gender gap is persisting in advanced industrial societies. The relationship between
ideology and gender is significant (-.17**) and in the expected direction, in model 1 without
controls. Gender remains significant even when controlling for social structure measures alone in
model 2 (-.22**) and with social structure and cultural attitude measures together in model 3 (.14**). These models show that not only do women prefer the left ideologically in advanced
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industrial societies, but also shows that gender is a strong and significant predictor of ideological
preference thus validating the hypothesis 1. In model 1, the adjusted r-squared is low, at (.00),
meaning that 0% of the variation in ideology is explained by gender which is somewhat
puzzling.
Surprisingly, employment status had little effect in both models 2 and 3, while the other
social structure measures did. However, Norris and Inglehart similarly found that paid
employment had a weak impact on the gender-ideology relationship in their regression models
displaying the effects of gender on the left-right voting scale in the 1990’s. The findings in their
social structures model and the social structures + cultural attitudes model were modest and
insignificant at a coefficient of .02 (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Another interesting find is that
socioeconomic status appears to be significant in both models 2 and 3 although the regression
coefficient is a low.00. This means for every one unit increase in socioeconomic status, there is
a “significant” .00 unit increase in ideological preference which is puzzling and a bit counterintuitive.
The pattern of the gender gap as influenced by post materialism (-.37**) and support for
the women’s movement (.28**) proved to be highly significant, which lends support to the
findings of Norris and Inglehart (2000) that the gender gap is strongly the product of cultural
attitudinal variables rather than structural measures alone. Interestingly, the relationships are in
opposite directions with post-materialist values indicating support for Leftist ideological views
among women while support for the women’s movement actually indicates support for Right
ideological alignment. Norris and Inglehart conversely showed the relationship between post-
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materialism and ideology and confidence in the women’s movement and ideology to be in the
same direction and indicative of alignment to the Left.
All of the independent variables proved to have a significant impact on ideology with the
exception of employment in models 2 and 3 and education in model 2. The age variable shows
some polarization with older respondents identifying with the right as predicted. Also, those
with low religious attendance appear to lean left which aligns with modernization theory and the
materialist/post-materialist argument. The adjusted r-squared in model 2 shows that 3% of the
variation in ideology is explained by the social structure variables and the adjusted r-squared in
model 3 shows that 9% of the variation in ideology is explained by both social structure and
cultural attitude variables. While the adjusted r squared values are reported and noted, the
unstandardized regression coefficients are the main focus and reference for gauging significance
throughout the thesis.
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Table 2: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Post-Communist Societies,
2004-2008
Model 4
Gender Only

Gender
Social Structure
Religiosity
Socioeconomic Status
Age
Education
Employment Status
(Employed)

Model 5
Gender + social
Structure

.02

-.01
-.10**
.00
.00
.04*
.07

Attitudes
Post Materialism
Support for women’s
Movement
Adj. R Squared
N
Standard Error

Model 6
Gender + social
Structure + cultural
Attitudes
-.05
-.09**
.01**
.01
.01
.12**

-.01
.02

.00
2,226

.01
2,162

.09

.10

.00
1,764
.11

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the ideological scale; 1=most left, 10=most right. Constant
not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05
Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008

Next, table 2 which shows the effects of gender on the left-right ideology scale mostly
supports hypothesis 2 that women in post-communist societies are more likely to hold more
traditional and Rightist ideological views. While gender alone is not a significant predictor of
ideology in post-communist societies as seen in model 4, the value (.02) is in the expected
direction. This lack of significance could be due to the fact that only three countries are in the
post-communist category, although the N is still pretty high at 2,226.
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Once social structure measures are introduced in model 5, religiosity proves to have a
significant effect (-.10**), while gender remains insignificant. As expected, post material
attitudes and support for the women’s movement had no significant effect on ideology, showing
that women retain traditional values in this region and continue align to the Right ideologically
in this regard. However, it is worth noting that the relationship between ideology and gender
reverses and becomes negative in model 6 when controlling for gender and social structure at (.05), which shows that a slow transformation toward the Left can be observed. Perhaps women
in post-communist societies are in the early stages of integrating Leftist ideologies as democracy
and its modernizing affect becomes more ingrained and persists in those regions.
Interestingly, education appears to be an insignificant factor with a coefficient of .00 in
model 5 and .01 in model 6 while Norris and Inglehart (2000) found it to be a significant factor
in their evaluation of the gender gap in post-communist societies. Similarly, their findings for
the age and employment measurements are insignificant as are the findings here.
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Table 3: The Effects of Gender on Left-Right Ideology Scale in Developing Societies, 20042008
Model 7
Gender Only

Gender
Social Structure
Religiosity
Socioeconomic Status
Age
Education
Employment Status
(Employed)

Model 8
Gender + social
Structure

.10**

.02
-.05**
.00*
.03*
-.07**
.01

Attitudes
Post Materialism
Support for women’s
Movement
Adj. R Squared
N
Standard Error

Model 9
Gender + social
Structure + cultural
Attitudes
.03
-.05**
.00**
.00
-.06**
.00

-.15**
.04

.00
9,887

.01
9,661

.05

.05

.01
8,781
.05

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the ideological scale; 1=most left, 10=most right. Constant
not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05
Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008

Table 3 which shows the effects of gender on ideology in developing societies also lends
support to hypothesis 3, that women are more likely to adopt right, traditional ideological stances
in developing societies. Model 7 shows that not only is gender is a significant predictor of
ideology at (.10*), but also that women in developing societies tend to lean right ideologically in
comparison to their advanced industrial counterparts. The adjusted r-squared for model 7 is low,
at (.00). However, when the social structure controls are introduced in model 8, the relationship
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becomes insignificant at .02 and remains insignificant in model 9 at .03 when cultural attitudes
are also introduced.
Age and employment status appear to have little effect on ideology in models 8 and 9.
This finding is interesting because age seems to play a significant role in ideology in advanced
industrial societies according to table 1. Norris and Inglehart (2000) explain that in advanced
industrial societies, older generations of women tend to be more Conservative or lean Right
while younger women tend to lean Left. Perhaps the lack of an established, long-running
democracy in the developing countries along with previously established cultural norms leads to
a lack of significance or lack of difference between the ages in regard to ideology.
Religiosity and education again show to be significant factors in impacting the nature of
the gender gap. Model 9 which also includes the cultural attitudes controls flips the relationship
back to the direction of model 7 though not significantly. Post material values seem to be
driving this gap as this measure is significant (-.15**), which indicates that the values of women
in developing societies could be getting closer to that of women in advanced industrial societies,
thus impacting their ideological stances. Confidence in the women’s movement has only a
modest effect on ideology at (.04).
Overall, the modern gender gap is strongest and most prevalent in advanced
industrialized societies as hypothesized. The gender gap does not appear to be strong or
significant in all three post-communist models, which was expected. However, the gap is
significant in developing societies before social structure and cultural attitude variables are
introduced, with women leaning to the right as hypothesized. When comparing the overall effect
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of the independent variables on ideology, developing countries and advanced industrial countries
are the most similar. For example, post-materialist attitudes have a strong, negative relationship
with ideology in both developing and advanced industrial societies. This finding may indicate
that in terms of cultural attitudes and social characteristics these societies are moving in the same
direction, with developing societies possibly mirroring the gender gap as observed in advanced
industrial societies in the future.
Also, the impact of religiosity on ideology is significant and directionally similar in
advanced industrial, post-communist, and developing societies, which is an interesting find.
Clearly, the relationship between religious attendance and ideology plays in important role in the
gender gap, as the religious affiliations of men and women will bear great influence on their
ideological leanings. Another observation is that education plays a significant role in ideological
affiliation in developing societies, but not in post-communist societies. As democracy as a
political institution and permanent regime persists in these societies, perhaps the effect of
education on ideological leanings will become more uniform and similar to each other and to that
of advanced industrial societies.
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Table 4: The Effect of Gender on Ideology in Advanced Industrialized, Post-Communist, and
Developing Societies by Country, 2004-2008
Gender Standard Adj. REffect
Error
Squared
Advanced Industrial
Australia
Canada
Finland
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
U.S.
Post-Communist
Poland
Romania
Ukraine
Developing
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
India
Mexico
South Africa
Taiwan
Turkey

N

-.18**
-.08
.01
.08
-.35**
.04
-.17*
-.10
-.21*
-.26**
-.03
-.11
-.40**
-.08*

.06
.07
.10
.14
.07
.14
.17
.10
.15
.08
.07
.09
.09
.06

.10
.05
.08
.08
.09
.07
.12
.07
.10
.09
.14
.20
.16
.10

2869
2921
1480
1001
2375
2134
1012
1274
1050
1969
2539
1687
1738
3280

-.01*
-.16
-.16

.18
.13
.11

.07
.01
.03

3091
3015
3811

-.07
-.07
.20**
.10
-.03
-.23**
.28**
.71**

.09
.11
.09
.14
.09
.06
.09
.10

.08
.01
.04
.03
.02
.02
.04
.14

1694
2186
2107
2369
3672
6365
1869
4246

Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are
unstandardized coefficients representing the impact of the independent variables
(including social structure and cultural attitude variables) on the ideological scale; 1=most left,
10=most right. Constant not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05 Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008

Finally, table 4 displays the effects of gender on ideology by nation in order to show
which countries are actually experiencing a gender gap. Based on the models, every advanced
industrialized nation included above is experiencing a modern gender gap with women leaning to
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the Left ideologically, except for Finland, France, and Great Britain. The gap is particularly
significant in Australia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the United
States. These findings differ somewhat from Norris and Inglehart’s analysis of the gender gap in
voting in the 1990’s, as their results suggest that the gap was significant in all advanced
industrial nations with women leaning Left. However, ideology is the dependent variable in this
analysis rather than vote choice, which may explain the variation or differences between the
findings.
All three post-communist nations, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine showed evidence of an
emerging modern gender gap. In Poland, women leaned toward the Left significantly more than
men at (-.01*). Next, the findings for the developing nations were the most diverse with the
greatest variations. Women are leaning more to the Left than men in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico and this effect is significant in South Africa (-.23**). In Chile, Taiwan, and Turkey
women are leaning to the Right significantly. Also, women appear to be leaning to the Right in
India however this finding is modest and not significant. Ultimately, these regression models
show which specific countries are driving the gender gap, either modern or traditional, in their
respective societal types.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE U.S. SPECIFIC ANALYSIS
Table 5: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the U.S. by Decade
1970’s

1980’s

1990’s

2000’s

2012

Gender

-.04

-.12**

-.29**

-.35**

-.08

Social
Structure
Race

-1.29**

-1.57**

-1.56**

-1.82**

-2.26**

Age

.01**

-.00**

-.01**

-.01**

.00

Religiosity

.01

.04**

.08**

.11**

.10**

Employment

-.11**

.06

-.08*

-.02

.19**

Education

.31**

.22**

.26**

.17**

.15**

Marital Status

.12**

.06

.15**

.31**

.30**

Cultural
Attitudes
Abortion

-.01

.03**

.16**

.21**

.49**

Adj. R
Squared
N

.07

.09

.11

.16

.27

6653

9116

8852

3738

3282

Standard Error

.05

.04

.04

.06

.06

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section
Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point party identification scale, 1= strong Dem, 7=
Strong Rep. Constant not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 4, showing the effects of gender on party identification in the United States lends
support to hypothesis 4 which claims that women are increasingly identifying with the
Democratic Party (and liberal ideology). From the 1970’s to 2012, an overall trend of women
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leaning toward the Democratic Party can be observed. The effect of gender on party
identification is significant in the 1980’s to the 2000’s, but modest in the 1970’s and in 2012.
Because the modern gender gap was not recognized in the U.S. until the 1980’s the lack of
significance of the gap in the 1970’s comes as no surprise. However, the findings for 2012 are
surprising and interesting, as the gap should intuitively increase in strength over time. The lack
of significance of the gender gap in 2012 could be explained by the significant effect of other
variables on party identification. In fact, all of the cultural attitude and social structure variables,
with the exception of the age measure, appear to be significant indicators of party preference.
Some other interesting but intuitive findings are that the effect of race remains significant
throughout the decades with African Americans identifying overwhelmingly with the
Democratic Party. Also, high church attendance, high education levels, being married, and being
pro-life are all indicative of Republican Party support. While this finding is logical given that
the Republican Party appeals to Americans with value and moral systems that align with these
particular views, their strong effect on party identification over decades is worth noting.
Next, the effect of gender on ideology will be explored and compared to these findings on the
nature of the gender gap in the United States.
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Table 6: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in the U.S. by Decade
1970’s

1980’s

1990’s

2000’s

2012

-.04

-.13**

-.23**

-.29**

-.05

Race

-.93**

-.39**

-.41**

-.33**

-.57**

Age

.01**

.00**

.00**

.01**

.04**

Religiosity

.12**

.11**

.15**

Employment

.00

.06*

.06

.04

.09

Education

-.02

.02

-.09**

-.04

.01

Marital Status

.21**

.24**

.24**

.29**

.19**

.11**

.18**

.27**

.40**

Gender
Social
Structure

.15**

.12**

Cultural
Attitudes
Abortion

.05**

Adj. R Squared

.10

.12

.13

.12

.17

N

4418

6323

6638

2155

3012

Standard Error

.06

.05

.05

.09

.05

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section
Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point ideological scale, 1= Extremely Lib,
7=Extremely Con. Constant not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 6 shows the effect of gender on ideology by decade from the 1970s to 2012 and
shows that the United States, as an advanced industrial society, is experiencing a modern gender
gap thus supporting hypothesis 4. The gender gap behaves similarly in regard to ideology and
partisanship even when controlling for cultural attitudes and social structure, with an observably
significant effect of gender on ideology in the 1980’s to the 2000’s.
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Unfortunately, the effect of gender is insignificant in 2012 at (-.05) just like the effect of
gender in 2012 on partisanship. In both tables 5 and 6 abortion appears to have an increasingly
strong effect on the dependent variables, which suggests that the effect of abortion may be
washing out the effect of gender. Perhaps abortion attitudes are more polarizing, relevant, and
salient with time in the United States. The strong effects of race and marital status cannot be
discounted as contributing to the insignificant effect of gender in 2012, however the effects of
race and marital status do not appear to be increasing in strength dramatically as the abortion
effect does.
Age has a greater effect on ideology from the 1970’s to 2012 than it did on partisanship.
Older age indicates support for conservatism according to table 6, which is intuitive. Religiosity
also has a significant effect on ideology similar to that of party identification, with higher church
attendance indicating conservative ideological affiliation. Furthermore, the strength of the effect
of religious attendance shows the significance and relevance of religion in the United States and
its institutions, particularly partisan and electoral institutions. Also, just as high religious
attendance, being married, and being pro-life indicated Republican Party preference, these
cultural and social attitudes also indicate a preference for conservative ideology.
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Table 7: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the Northeastern U.S.
1970’s

1980’s

1990’s

2000’s

2012

-.10

-.10

-.16*

-.41**

-.18

Race

-1.09**

-1.68**

-1.44**

-1.15**

-2.05**

Age

.01

.00

.00

.00

-.05*

Religiosity

.00

.02

.05

.10*

-.01

Employment

-.10

.04

-.07

-.03

-.29

Education

.19**

.17**

.15**

-.02

-.16**

Marital Status

.22**

.15

.24**

.53**

.93**

Abortion

-.03

.01

.13**

.21**

.41**

Adj. R Squared

.04

.09

.08

.10

.22

N

1470

1700

1527

583

529

Standard Error

.10

.09

.10

.15

.17

Gender
Social
Structure

Cultural
Attitudes

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section
Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point party identification scale, 1= strong Dem, 7=
Strong Rep. Constant not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 7 addresses hypothesis 6 which claims that women in the northeast tend to identify
with the Democratic Party (and Liberal ideology) more than men and the findings mostly support
this claim. Overall, women appear to be leaning toward the Democratic Party in the Northeast
from the 1970’s to 2012. The effect of gender on party identification is significant in the 1990’s
and 2000’s and like the models including the entire U.S., significance fades in 2012.
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One interesting finding is that the age measurement has not effect on party identification
from the 1970’s to the 2000’s and then in 2012, it has a significant affect at (-.05*). This result
indicates that younger people identify more with the Democratic Party in the northeast, which
provides support for the developmental theory of the gender gap. Also, religiosity or religious
attendance has little effect on partisanship in the northeast as it only appears to be significant in
the 2000’s which differs from the findings on the entire U.S. The effect of education on party
identification in the northeast also differs from that of the whole U.S. in that high levels of
education indicate Republican Party affiliation in the northeast until the 2000’s and in 2012,
higher education actually becomes a significant indicator of Democratic Party affiliation at (.16**).
While the effect of some of the social structure variables on partisanship in the northeast
defects from the situation of the entire U.S. in the aforementioned ways, some independent
variables have a similar effect on partisanship in the U.S. and in the northeast. For example, the
abortion attitude effect increases in significance and size in both the northeast and the U.S. Also,
the marital status effect maintains significance and a similar relationship directionally, with
married women leaning toward the Republican Party, in the northeast like in the U.S. as a whole.
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Table 8: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in the Northeastern U.S. by Decade
1970’s

1980’s

1990’s

2000’s

2012

-.10

-.25**

-.36**

-.49**

-.14

Race

-.55**

-.51**

-.28**

-.29**

-.37*

Age

.01*

.00

.00

.01**

-.01

Religiosity

-.03

.09**

.11**

.12**

.03

Employment

-.06

.11

-.04

.33*

-.12

Education

-.69**

.02

-.15**

-.19**

-.07

Marital Status

.21

.21**

.17**

.18

.32**

Abortion

.15**

.11**

.10**

.31**

.45**

Adj. R Squared

.10

.07

.08

.15

.17

N

1326

1231

1201

328

490

Standard Error

.14

.12

.11

.23

.12

Gender
Social
Structure

Cultural
Attitudes

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section
Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point ideological scale, 1= strong Dem, 7= Strong
Rep. Constant not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 8 also looks at the northeast but shows the effects of gender on ideology rather than
partisanship. Like the findings in table 7, the findings in table 8 support the hypothesis that
women in the northeast are more liberal (and Democratic) than their male counterparts. In fact,
the effect of gender on ideology is stronger and more significant over time than the effect of
gender on partisanship in the northeast, as the effect is significant with women leaning toward
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liberal ideological affiliations from the 1980’s to the 1990’s. Like in previous models, the effect
of gender is insignificant in the 1970’s and in 2012 which is not surprising
Race and abortion attitudes remain significant predictors of ideological affiliation from
the 1970’s to 2012. From the 1980’s to the 2000’s, high religious attendance has a significant
effect on ideology while this effect was only significant in the 2000’s on partisanship in the
northeast which is an interesting find. This shows that religiosity is an important predictor of
ideology in the U.S. but perhaps less important when looking at only partisanship. Another
difference between ideology and partisanship in the northeast pertains to the effect of education.
High levels of education indicate liberal ideological leanings in the 1970’s, 1990’s, and 2000’s
while high levels of education actually indicate conservative leanings in these decades.
However, in the 2000’s, the effect of education party identification in the northeast does reverse.
While employment has little effect on ideology and partisanship overall in the northeast,
in the 2000’s employment had a significant effect on ideology at (.33*). This indicates that at
this time those who were employed held conservative ideological preferences. The differences
in the effects of the independent variables on ideology and partisanship in one region are
interesting and enhance the importance of looking at both dependent variables to better gauge the
attitudes of the electorate or just citizens in general. Next, tables 9 and 10 show the effects of
gender on ideology and party identification in the south and provides comparisons to the effects
in the northeast.
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Table 9: The Effects of Gender on Party Identification in the Southern U.S. by Decade
1970’s

1980’s

1990’s

2000’s

2012

-.07

-.16**

-.28**

-.39**

-.04

Race

-.97**

-1.28**

-1.47**

-2.05**

-2.58**

Age

-.01**

-.01**

-.02**

-.01**

-.01

Religiosity

.04

-.01

.07**

.07**

.06

Employment

-.14

-.02

-.03

-.08

.22*

Education

.22**

.20**

.30**

.24**

.13**

Marital Status

.03

-.07

-.04

.40**

.32**

Abortion

.06**

.02

.16**

.15**

.41**

Adj. R Squared

.07

.10

.15

.25

.37

N

1770

2790

2895

1341

1187

Standard Error

.09

.07

.07

.10

.10

Gender
Social
Structure

Cultural
Attitudes

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section
Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point party identification scale, 1= strong Dem, 7=
Strong Rep. Constant not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05

Table 9 shows the effects of gender on party identification in the south and provides
support for hypothesis 5 which claims that women in the south are increasingly identifying with
the Democratic Party regardless of the Republican stronghold in this region. From the 1970’s to
2012, a distinct trend can be observed of women leaning toward the Democratic Party which
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closely mirrors the effect that is taking place in the northeast. From the 1980’s to the 2000’s, this
effect is significant and especially surprising since the effect of gender on partisanship was not
significant in the 1980’s in the predominately Democratic northeast.
Like previous regression models, race and abortion attitudes maintain a significant effect
on party identification. Throughout the decades, education has had a consistently strong effect
party identification in the south, with higher education indicating Republican Party affiliation.
Age also has a significant effect on partisanship from the 1970’s to 2000’s with younger people
preferring the Democratic Party.
Surprisingly, religiosity is only significant in the 1990’s to the 2000’s with high religious
attendance indicating Republican Party affiliation in these decades. In the northeast, religious
attendance is a significant predictor of ideology over a longer span of time from the 1980’s to the
2000’s regardless of the fact that the northeast is considered to be the more secular of the two
regions.

Still, the most relevant finding this table provides is that women are continuing to

increasingly identify with the Democratic Party in the south regardless of the prominence of the
Republican Party in this region.
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Table 10: The Effects of Gender on Ideology in Southern U.S. by Decade
1970’s

1980’s

1990’s

2000’s

2012

-.05

-.09

-.25**

-.25**

-.07

Race

1.12**

-.44**

-.41**

-.37**

-.66**

Age

.01**

.00**

.00*

.00

.03**

Religiosity

.12**

.14**

.17**

.18**

.17**

Employment

-.12

.09

-.07

-.09

.04

Education

.02

.00

-.07**

.01

-.01

Marital Status

.21**

.19**

.14**

.29**

.30**

Abortion

.07**

.10**

.15**

.23**

.29**

Adj. R Squared

.14

.07

.10

.13

.17

N

1075

1697

1930

1075

1076

Standard Error

.06

.09

.08

.10

.08

Gender
Social
Structure

Cultural
Attitudes

Source: ANES Cumulative file and 2012 ANES Cross-Section
Note: the models are based on multivariate regression analysis. The figures are unstandardized coefficients
representing the impact of the independent variables on the 7-point ideological scale, 1= Extremely Lib, 7=
Extremely Con. Constant not reported.
*p<.10 **p<.05

Finally, table 10 shows the effects of gender on ideology in the south by decade and also
confirms the claim of hypothesis 5, that women in the south are more liberal (and more
Democratic) than their male counterparts in the region. From the 1970’s to 2012, women are
leaning toward liberal ideological affiliation in the south. Furthermore, in the 1990’s to the
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2000’s this effect is significant just as the effect of gender on party identification in the south is
significant during these decades.
Following suit with the previous regression findings, abortion and race measures have a
significant effect on ideology over time. Age, marital status, and religiosity also maintain
significance throughout time in the south, with older respondents, married respondents and
respondents with high church attendance leaning toward conservative ideological affiliations.
Many of the independent variables have similar effects on ideology in the south and in the
northeast which is particularly interesting given how polarized the regions are widely considered
to be.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Cross-National Conclusions and Implications
All in all, the findings in chapters 4 mostly support the hypotheses that (1) women in
advanced industrial societies are more likely to identify with Leftist ideology than men and (3)
women in developing societies are more likely to identify with ideologies of the Right than that
of their post-industrial counterparts. Once social structure and cultural attitude measures were
introduced in the post-communist models, women actually appeared to lean left which does not
support hypothesis (2) that women in post-communist societies are more likely to identify with
Rightist ideology than their male counterparts. Also, Table 4 which displayed regression models
of the effects of gender on ideology in each individual nation provided further insight on the
specific countries that are driving the modern gender gap and which nations continue to maintain
a traditional one. These findings in the extension of Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) study lend
additional support to the developmental theory of the gender gap in ideology on a cross-national
level.
The modern gender gap was less evident in post-communist and developing societies as
predicted with women leaning toward a Rightist ideological orientation significantly in
developing societies before social structure and cultural attitude measures were introduced and
women actually leaning left in post-communist societies after the introduction of controls. In
both cases, the findings were mostly modest and insignificant. However, post-communist
societies actually showed evidence of going through a secular realignment characterized by
women moving toward the Left ideologically. This phenomenon occurring in post-communist

50

societies provides further evidentiary support to Norris and Inglehart’s notion of the
developmental theory of the gender gap in that an established democratic regime along with
secularization impacts ideology and party identification in a predictable way. This finding also
implies that a greater focus should be placed on post-communist countries and developing ones
as well in this line of research to better gauge the strength of the gender gap and the validity of
the developmental theory.
Another important finding was the significant effect of post-materialist values and
confidence in the women’s movement on ideology in advanced industrial nations. As posited in
the developmental theory of the gender gap, cultural and social trends unique to advanced
industrial societies realign women to the left ideologically. Because these post-materials values
and confidence in the women’s movement had such a substantial impact on ideological
orientation in these societies, this study provides support to the developmental theory in this
regard. Moreover, the results in chapter 4 certainly add to the literature on ideology and the
gender gap through this extension of Norris and Inglehart’s (2000) study to 2008.
U.S. Specific Conclusion and Implications
Next, in chapter 5 the presence of the modern gender gap is tested in the United States
with an overall trend of women leaning toward Liberal ideology and toward the Democratic
Party for over four decades, adding support to hypothesis (4) which claims that women in the
U.S. are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male
counterparts. From the 1980’s to the 2000’s gender had a significant effect on ideology and
partisanship. Unfortunately, the gender gap was modest in the 1970’s and 2012, but these
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understated findings may be explained by the strong and significant effect of other variables like
abortion attitudes. Regardless of this setback, an overall trend toward women adopting Liberal
ideological stances and identifying with the Democratic Party can be seen over time even with
the introduction of social structure and cultural attitude controls. These findings add to the
literature on ideology, partisanship, and the gender gap in the United States by providing
findings that span from the 1970s to 2012 in support of the developmental theory. By including
a number of social and cultural control variables, the findings are robust and show evidence of an
increasingly relevant gender gap worthy of further study.
In testing the gender gap in the United States, an in depth analysis of the southern and
northeastern U.S. was employed in order to test the hypotheses that (5) women in the south are
more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and liberal ideology than their male
counterparts and (6) women in the northeast are more likely to identify with the Democratic
Party and liberal ideology than their male counterparts. Both hypotheses are mostly supported
by the regression model findings. In the northeast, the effect of gender on party identification
was significant in the 1990’s to the 2000’s and the effect of gender on ideology was significant
in the 1980’s to the 2000’s. These findings are not only intuitive because the United States is an
advanced industrialized society, but also because the northeast specifically is an industrialized
and more secular region in the United States.
In the south, the effect of gender on partisanship was significant in the 1990’s to the
2000’s with women leaning toward the Democratic Party and the effect of gender on ideology
was significant in the 1990’s to 2000’s with women leaning toward liberal ideology. While these
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findings support the hypothesis, the fact that the modern gender gap persists in this region given
the prominence of the Republican Party and conservative ideological affiliations in southern
states is a valuable finding. Regardless of the partisan and ideological stronghold, women are
still identifying with the Democratic Party and liberal ideologies in the south while men in the
region are increasingly identifying with the Republican Party and conservative ideologies. All in
all, the gender gap behaves similarly in the northeast and the south and persists in these regions.
These findings add to the literature on partisanship and ideology in the U.S. and should be
considered in future studies in the northeast and the south.
Future Research
In regards to performing a cross-national analysis, including a measure of party
identification or voting preference as a main dependent variable would allow for a more
complete replication of and would function as a useful addition to Norris and Inglehart’s (2000)
analysis. Unfortunately some issues were posed with the party choice variable in the World
Values Survey data set in this analysis, but utilization of such a variable in conjecture with the
Inglehart-Huber (1995) expert party location scale would provide some interesting insight into
the nature of the gender gap in party choice across various countries and society types. This
scale provides codes for political parties across numerous democracies, rating them on a scale
from 1=left to 10=right ideologically. If not this scale, a new, updated scale would be even more
preferable in accurately understanding the nature of the gender gap today and in the future.
In order to further explore the developmental theory of the gender gap, future research
should continue to study less developed countries (LDCs), newly industrialized countries (NICs)
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and post-communist societies. As the regression models for the gender gap in post-communist
societies showed, these nations may be experiencing a secular realignment with women leaning
toward the left ideologically like advanced industrial societies. The LDCs and NICs had more
variation, with some countries maintaining the traditional gender gap with women leaning to the
Right and some nations experiencing a modern gender gap with women leaning toward the Left.
By the reasoning of the developmental theory, as democratization, modernization, and
industrialization persists these LDCs and NICs should eventually experience the modern gender
gap as advanced industrialized nations do. Only through continual focus on partisanship and
ideological affiliations in these regions can we better assess the validity of the developmental
theory of the gender gap.
Additionally, other independent variables could certainly be included in later studies in
order to have a more thorough evaluation of the gender gap topic. For example, a variable
including different races like Asians or Hispanics could show how the gap varies on the basis of
race in the United States. Race and/or ethnicity may be a challenging measure to include in a
cross-national analysis, given that so many different races would be have to be compared in a
comprehensive and intuitive manner. Also, focusing on generational differences in the gender
gap would certainly add to the existing literature. While age is included as an independent
variable in this study, disaggregating the variable and looking at respondents under 30 against
those over 30 years old could show stark differences in partisanship and ideological affiliation.
Because younger women and men in the U.S. are identifying more with liberal ideology and the
Democratic Party, examining this generation with and against older generations would show that
other types of gender gaps exist (Norris and Inglehart 2000). Additionally, the inclusion of a
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correlation between party identification and ideology in order to gauge how similar or different
they are as dependent variables would be a helpful addition to future analyses. If they are
extremely similar or highly correlated, only one dependent variable would be necessary but if
they prove to have little to no correlation the inclusion of both would be pertinent in studying the
gender gap.
Also, a state by state analysis of the gender gap in partisanship and ideology would be
interesting to pursue, in that the cultural influence of individual states on the gender gap could be
better assessed and understood in the United States. Specifically, the Cooperative Congressional
Election Study (CCES) survey has a large enough N to perform a state by state analysis and
would be particularly useful to include in further research. Large states with great variation in
the population and in cultural attitudes and social structure may have an intra-state gender gap,
which is an understudied area in U.S. politics. The U.S. specific analysis in this piece only
included the northeast and the south as the regional variables as they are commonly believed to
be the most polarized regions in regard to partisanship and ideology, but including the west and
central United States in future studies would greatly benefit the existing literature by supporting
or disproving the gender gap in the U.S. with a truly complete analysis of all 50 states.
Future researchers may also benefit from using a complete 2010’s decade control variable
in analyses of the gender gap in the U.S or across nations. Perhaps some of the understated
findings regarding the weak relationship found between partisanship and gender and ideology
and gender in 2012 in the United States is due to the fact that the analyses only include one year.
Analyzing an entire decade may show a stronger relationship between gender and ideology and
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gender and party identification as observed in previous decades but post-realignment. Obviously
this study was restricted being that it is currently 2014 and the American National Election Study
(ANES) Time Series only included the year 2012. While such a decade variable is out of the
scope of this research for obvious regions, analyzing the gender gap in the entire 2010s decade
could certainly provide some insight on the prevalence or potential insignificance of this
phenomenon.
Given that the U.S. is experiencing a modern gender gap based on these findings, an
analysis of the gap before, during, and after the 2016 presidential election would be especially
interesting as Hillary Clinton may be on the Democratic ticket. A female presidential candidate
may be particularly polarizing, with women becoming even more Democratic in order to support
a woman and men moving further toward the Republican Party. On the other hand, Hillary
Clinton is somewhat polarizing in her own right, with men and women having mixed feelings
and attitudes toward her and her past political experience and actions. Undoubtedly this unique
occurrence in which a woman is in the running for the presidency would provide interesting
insight and results into the nature of the gender gap in the U.S.
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